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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This law suit was commenced on October 7, 2016, when Monitor Finance, L.C. 
("Monitor") and First Capital Funding, L.C. ("First Capital")( collectively "Respondents") filed 
their Complaint to Judicially Foreclose a Deed of Trust ("Complaint"). The Complaint sought to 
enforce a Trust Deed Note dated December 30, 2005, in the original p1incipal amount of 
$244,000.00 ("Trust Deed Note"), as amended by a March 3, 2008 Modification, 
("Modification"); and to judicially foreclose a Trust Deed, Assigmnent of Rents, Security 
Agreement and Fixture Filing ("Deed of Trust") securing that obligation. 
Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC ("Wildlife Ridge") filed its Answer and Counter-claim 
seeking damages and a declaration from the trial court that the Trust Deed Note, Modification, 
and the Deed of Trust were unenforceable and that the Respondents should be enjoined from 
foreclosing the Deed of Trust ("Answer and Counterclaim"). R. Vol. I, pp. 51 - 69. Wildlife 
Ridge's Affinnative Defenses included (1) Statute of Limitations - p. 53, ,llO, (2) Laches - p. 
53, ,ll 1, (3) Collateral Estoppel - p.53, ,l12, (4) Res Judicata, claim and/or issue preclusion - p. 
53, ,ll3, (5) Unclean Hands - p. 53, ,ll4, and (6) Fraud-p. 60. 
This Appeal follows the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondents. 
The trial court concluded that Wildlife Ridge's affi1111ative defenses and counterclaim for fraud 
were precluded bythedoctrineofresjudicata. R. Vol. Ipp. 135-149, 171-192. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Wildlife Ridge acquired the property described in the Deed of Trust on June 13, 2006, R. 
Aug. pp. 46-48. At that time, Respondents had already been granted the beneficial interest in 
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that land to secure the obligations described in the Deed of Trust, and legal title to that property 
had been transferred to Pioneer Title Company as trustee of the Deed of Trust. R. Vol. I pp. 27-
50, 106-130. 
The enforceability of the Deed of Trust, and the alleged satisfaction of the obligations 
secured by that Deed of Trust were the subject of a prior lawsuit brought by Wildlife Ridge 
against Respondents on December 3, 2014. R. Aug. pp 1-21 (the "First Action"). In the First 
Action Wildlife Ridge sought a decree quieting title in its name to the property described in the 
Deed of Trust, free and clear of the Deed of Trust, along with a declaration from the Court that 
the sums due and owing the Respondents and secured by the Deed of Trust had "been satisfied 
by previously (sic) payments made to First Capital, L.C. and Monitor Finance, L.C." R. Aug. 
pp. 4, ,r16. Wildlife Ridge's Amended Complaint, filed in the First Action on March 12, 
2015, sought that san1e relief. R. Aug. p. 9, ,r12. 
On March 26, 2015, Respondents filed their Answer to the Amended Complaint and 
denied Wildlife Ridge's right to any of the relief sought in its Amended Complaint. R. Aug. pp. 
11 - 15. 
On June 8, 2016, a Stipulation for Dismissal With Prejudice between Wildlife Ridge and 
Respondents was filed in the First Action, and on June 14, 2016, the First Action was dismissed 
by the court, with prejudice, with each paiiy bearing their own attorney fees and costs of suit (the 
"Dismissal of the First Action"). R. Aug. pp. 16 - 21. 
On January 6, 2017, the Respondents filed their motion for partial summary judgment in 
the present case, seeking to strike all defenses raised by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer and 
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Counter-claim under the applicable doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and claim 
preclusion. R. Vol. I pp. 4, 136, 172. Respondents argued that the dismissal of the First Action 
not only defeated the claims of Wildlife Ridge as alleged in the First Action, but also defeated 
every other defense or claim challenging the enforceability of the Respondents' Trust Deed Note, 
Modification, and Deed of Trust which might and should have been litigated in the First Action. 
On March 27, 2017, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order granting 
Respondents' motion for partial smmnary judgment. R. Vol. I pp. 135 - 149. The trial court 
concluded that "the Defendant's affim1ative defenses and fraud claim are ba1Ted by the doctrine 
of res judicata. Therefore, all of the affomative defenses listed in Defendant's Answer, as well 
as the Defendant's Counterclaim for fraud are hereby stricken and dismissed." R. Vol. Ip. 147. 
On April 13, 2017, Respondents filed another motion for summary judgment seeking the 
entry of a decree of foreclosure and the determination of the actual amount due and owing under 
the Trust Deed Note and Modification (the "Second Summary Judgment Motion"). R. Vol. I pp. 
6, 172. Wildlife Ridge opposed the Second Smmnary Judgment Motion by filing its Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Court's March 27, 2017 Memorandum Decision and Order, but it did not 
submit any opposing affidavits or additional evidence. R. Vol. Ip. 172. 
On Jm1e 13, 2017, the trial comi issued its Memorandum Decision and Order granting 
Respondent's Second Summary Judgment Motion and denying Wildlife Ridge's motion for 
reconsideration. R. Vol. I pp. 171 - 192. 
On June 20, 2017, the trial court entered its Judgment, Decree of Foreclosure and Order 
of Sale autho1izing Respondents to proceed to foreclose the Deed of Trust at a sheriffs 
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foreclosure sale. R. Vol. Ip 198 - 202. The sheriffs foreclosure sale was held on August 30, 
2017, and Respondents became the purchasers of the two remaining lots encumbered by the 
Deed of Trust. See, Exhibits "6", "7", and "8" to Affidavit in Support of Motion to Dismiss 
Appeal for Mootness dated April 4, 2018 (the "Mootness Affidavit"). 
Respondents also received payment of the net sale proceeds from the prior voluntary sale 
of six (6) lots burdened by the Respondents' Deed of Trust. See, Mootness Affidavit, Exhibits 
"1," "2," and "3." 
When Wildlife Ridge acquired the prope1iy encumbered by the Deed of Trust on June 13, 
2006, the Deed of Trust stated that it was: 
"given for the purpose of securing the following obligations ( collectively the 
"Obligations" ofTrustor [M & S Development]: 
2.1.1 Note. The payment and perfonnance of each and every agreement and 
obligation under the Note [ defined on page 1 of the Deed of Trust as the Trust 
Deed Note] .... 
*** 
2.1.5 Other Obligations. The payment and perfonnance of any other note or 
obligation reciting that it is secured by this Trust Deed. Trustor expressly 
acknowledges its mutual intent with Beneficiary that the security interest created 
by this Trust Deed secure any and all present and future debts, obligations, and 
liabilities of Trustor to Beneficiary without any limitation whatsoever." 
R. Vol. I pp. 30 and 109. 
The Modification expressly stated that the makers of the Trust Deed Note, Millward and 
M & S Development, and the Respondents "acknowledge that the same tenns and conditions of 
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the original Note and Trust Deed will apply to the amended amount and tenns." R. Vol. I pp. 26, 
104. 
Wildlife Ridge was aware of the Modification during the pendency of the First Action, as 
a copy of the Modification was provided to Wildlife Ridge in the Respondents' August 12, 2015 
response to Wildlife Ridge's First Set of Discovery. R. Aug pp. 53-54 and 56 - 173. See, R. 
Aug. p. 169. There is no evidence in the record that Wildlife Ridge was not aware of the 
Modification during the pendency of the First Action. 
The makers of the Trust Deed Note, Millward and M & S Development, and the Granter 
of the Deed of Trust, M & S Development, were not named as Defendants in the First Action by 
Wildlife Ridge. 
The Answer and Counterclaim admitted that (1) Michael Millward1 was a debtor in a 
chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding filed on September 10, 2012, (2) the Millward bankruptcy was 
pending during the First Action, (3) Millward was protected by the automatic stay provided by 
11 U.S.C. §362, and (4) the Millward bankruptcy was dismissed on June 23, 2016. R. Vol. Ip. 
53, ,r7. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Respondents accept Wildlife Ridge's statement of Issues on Appeal, and add the 
following additional issue: 
1. Are the Respondents entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs on appeal 
pursuant to I.A.R. Rule 41 , and Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) and Idaho Code§ 12-121 ? 
1 Michael Millward ("Millward") and M & S Development, LLC ("M & S Development") were the makers of the 
Trust Deed Note and Modification; M & S Development was the grantor of the Deed of Trust. R. Vol. I pp. 22-50. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. Standard of Review. 
Respondents agree with Wildlife Ridge's description of the Standard of Review on 
Appeal. This Court is required to review a trial comi's grant of smmnary judgment de nova, 
applying the same standard used by a tiial court when ruling upon a smnmary judgment motion 
filed under I.R.C.P. Rule 56. 
The tI-ial comi recognized and employed the required standard of review when ruling 
upon the smmnary judgment motions filed by the Respondents. The tiial comi acknowledged 
that the undisputed facts had been established upon a preponderance of the evidence, with all 
reasonable inferences drawn in favor of Wildlife Ridge, that all disputed facts were construed 
liberally in favor of the non-moving party, Wildlife Ridge, and that all reasonable inferences that 
could be drawn from the record were drawn in favor of Wildlife Ridge. R. Vol. I 138, 186. 
B. The Dismissal of the First Action, With Prejudice, Required the Dismissal of 
Wildlife Ridge's Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim for Fraud in this Action Under 
the Doctrine of Res Judicata. 
The trial comi dismissed the Respondent's affinnative defenses and fraud counterclaim 
by employing of the doctiine of res judicata. The trial court detem1ined that the First Action 
between the parties ended in a final judgment on the merits, that the present case involves the 
same paiiies as the First Action, and that all of the claims in the present case arise out of the 
same transaction or series of trai1sactions at issue in the First Action. The gravamen of the First 




The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only subsequent re-litigation of a claim 
previously asserted, but also subsequent re-litigation of any claims relating to the same 
transaction which might have been asserted. The dismissal of the First Action served as a 
dismissal with prejudice of every claim that was available to Wildlife Ridge to challenge the 
existence and enforceability of the Trust Deed Note, the Modification, and the Deed of Trust at 
issue in the present case. 
Under principles of res judicata, a valid final judgment rendered on the merits by a comi 
of competent jurisdiction is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties upon 
the same claim. "[R]es judicata is an umbrella tenn for different but related concepts: claim 
preclusion and issue preclusion." Steve Wieland, Don't Let the Tab Decide Your Next 
infringement Dispute, 59 ADVOCATE 38 (2016); see also, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892, 
128 S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008). "Separate tests are used to determine whether 
claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies." Tic or Title Co. v. Stan ion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 
157 P.3d 613, 617 (2007)(intemal citation omitted). 
A final judgment bars a party from re-litigating that same claim, regardless of whether 
the subsequent litigation involves new or different issues. Sturgell, 553 U.S. at 892, 128 S. Ct. at 
2171. This Court has explained claim preclusion as follows: 
Claim preclusion bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the 
same claim or upon claims relating to the same cause of action. Under this 
doctrine, a claim is also precluded if it could have been brought in the previous 
action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (I) the original 
action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves the 
same parties as the original action, and (3) the present claim arises out of the same 
transaction or series of transactions as the original action. 
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Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 153 Idaho 73, 81, 278 P.3d 943, 951 (2012) (citations 
omitted, emphasis added). 
The doctrine of claim preclusion bars not only the subsequent re-litigation of a claim 
previously asserted, but also the subsequent re-litigation of any claims relating to the same 
causes of action which were actually made, or which might have been made. Elliot v. Darwin 
Neibaur Farms, 138 Idaho 92, 94, 57 P.3d 803, 805 (2002). As such, "in an action between the 
same parties upon the same claim or demand, the fonner adjudication concludes parties and 
privies not only as to every matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as 
to every matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit." Magic Valley 
Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 436-37, 849 P.2d 107, 109-10 (1993)(emphasis 
added); see also Joyce v. Mwphy Land & Irrigation Co., 35 Idaho 549, 553, 208 P. 241 , 242-43 
(1922). Similarly, "[i]ssue preclusion ... bars ' successive litigation of an issue of fact or law 
actually litigated and resolved in a valid court detennination essential to the prior judgment,' 
even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim." Sturgell, 553 U.S at 892, 128 S. Ct. 
at 2171 (internal citation omitted). When a comi finally detennines an issue in one case that is 
essential to that judgment, a litigant is batTed from raising the issue again in another lawsuit. 
Res judicata serves tlu·ee fundamental purposes: (1) it preserves the acceptability of 
judicial dispute resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would fo llow if the same 
matter were twice litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in 
protecting the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances the 
private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims. Hindmarsh, 138 Idaho 
at 94, 57 P.3d at 805 (quoting Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho 254, 257, 668 P.2d 130, 133 
(Ct.App.1 983)). 
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Stanion, 144 Idaho at 123, 157 P.3d at 617; see also, Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892, 128 
S. Ct. 2161, 2171, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008). 
Whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion bars relitigation between the same parties of 
a p1ior litigation is a question of law upon which this Comt exercises free review. 
Lohman v. Flynn, 139 Idaho 312, 319, 78 P.3d 379, 386 (2003). Res judicata is an 
affinnative defense and the party asserting it must prove all of the essential elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence. Foster v. City of St. Anthony, 122 Idaho 883, 890, 841 
P.2d 413, 420 (1992). 
Id. at 122, 157 P.3d at 616. 
Wildlife Ridge should have asserted in the First Action every legal rule and/or equitable 
principle or remedy available to establish that the Trust Deed Note and Modification were 
unenforceable. Instead it sought only to quiet title to the property described in the Deed of Trust 
on the basis that the obligations secured by that Deed of Trust had been satisfied. 
The doctrine of res judicata prohibits Wildlife Ridge from asse1ting any new or 
additional claims for relief in the present action because those claims for relief were available to 
it at the time of the First Action. When the First Action was dismissed, Wildlife Ridge lost the 
ability to relitigate any other legal rule or equitable principle designed to prevent the enforcement 
of the Trust Deed Note, Modification and Deed of Trust. 
1. Millward and M & S Development Were Not Indispensable Parties to the 
First Action and Their Absence as Parties Did Not Prevent Wildlife Ridge from Asserting 
Alternative Claims for Relief in the First Action. 
Wildlife Ridge admits in its b1ief to this Court that its affirmative defense of fraud was 
never raised in the First Action.2 But Wildlife Ridge then argues that it was barred from 
2 Appellant's Brief, p. 8. 
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asserting that defense in the First Action because one of the makers of the Trust Deed Note, 
Millward, was a debtor in bankruptcy during the pendency of the First Action and therefore 
protected by the automatic stay provided by 11 U.S.C. §362. The other maker of the Trust Deed 
Note and grantor of the Deed of Trust, M & S Development, was not a party to the First Action, 
either. Wildlife Ridge argues that due to the absence of Millward and M &S Development as 
parties in the First Action, the defenses and counter claims raised in the present action could not 
have been litigated by it in the First Action and therefore could not be precluded by the doctrine 
of res judicata in the present case. Respondents dispute that argument. 
All of the factual allegations supporting the affinnative defenses and fraud claim alleged 
in the Answer and Counterclaim existed during the pendency of the First Action and there is no 
valid reason why the same factual allegations and claims for legal and equitable relief could not 
have been asserted against the Respondents in the First Action. 
Whether a party is "indispensable" is governed by I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l). Under that rule, a 
party shall be joined if: 
(A) in that person's absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing 
parties; or 
(B) that person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that disposing of the action in the person's absence may: 
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's ability to protect the 
interest; or 
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(ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incuning double, 
multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations because of the interest. 
Idaho R. Civ. P. 19(a). 
Complete relief could have been granted to Wildlife Ridge if the court in the First Action 
had been asked to grant the same relief sought by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer and 
Counterclaim. Wildlife Ridge could have asserted in the First Action that the Trust Deed Note 
and Modification were unenforceable because the statute of limitations had run on the 
obligations secured by the Deed of Ttust. Or, that the Modification was the product of 
fraudulent conduct on the part of Respondents. Wildlife Ridge could have asked the trial court in 
the First Action to enjoin Respondents from ever taking action to enforce the Trust Deed Note, 
Modification, and Deed of Trust. Millward and M & S Development were not indispensable 
parties. "A victim of wrongdoing is not generally required to sue all wrongdoers. Certainly not 
in a tort case, where the rnle of joint and several liability reigns; ... " Babb v. Mid-Am. Auto Exch. , 
Inc., 2006 WL 2714273 at *2 (D. Km1. Sept 22, 2006). 
If the Trnst Deed Note, Modification and Deed of Trnst had been rendered completely 
unenforceable in the First Action, it would not matter on which grounds Wildlife Ridge would 
have rendered these instruments unenforceable, or the basis for such a judicial finding. That 
outcome would not have adversely affected either Millward or M & S Development since the 




There was no risk that Millward or M & S Development would be exposed to double, 
multiple or otherwise inconsistent obligations since Respondents would have been bound by the 
First Action's ruling that the Trust Deed Note, Modification and Deed of Trust were 
unenforceable, no matter whether the basis of that decision was that the debt had been satisfied 
or that the debt was unenforceable based on the statute of limitations or fraud arguments urged 
by Wildlife Ridge in its Answer and Counterclaim. See, Magic Valley Radiology, supra. 
As such, Millward and M & S Development were not indispensable parties with respect 
to Wildlife Ridge's claims in the First Action and Wildlife Ridge's unsuccessful first attempt to 
have the Deed of Trust declared unenforceable precludes a second attempt via the new claims for 
relief set out in its Answer and Counterclaim. 
2. Wildlife Ridge Could Have Asserted the Statute of Limitations and Other 
Grounds for Relief in the First Action. 
Wildlife Ridge, in part 3. of its Brief, argues that the relief it sought in the First Action 
was baned by this Court's decision in Trusty v. Ray, 73 Idaho 232, 249 P.2d 814 (1952). In 
Trusty this Court detennined that a "mortgagor or his successor in interest cannot quiet title 
against a mo1igagee, while the secured deb! remains unpaid, although the statute of limitations 
has run against the right to foreclose the mortgage." 
Wildlife's reliance on Trusty is over broad. This Court's decision in Trusty only 
concluded that the "mortgagor or his successor in interest cannot quiet title against a mortgagee, 
while the secured debt remains unpaid, although the statute of limitations has run against the 
right to foreclose the mo1igage." 
Respondents' Brief 
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The rule stated in Trusty did not prohibit Wildlife Ridge from bringing all other available 
claims for legal or equitable relief in the First Action. Even if the quiet title relief Wildlife Ridge 
sought in the First Action was barred by Trusty, the Trusty decision did not prevent Wildlife 
Ridge from claiming that the obligations secured by the Deed of Trust were otherwise 
unenforceable because of the running of the statute of limitations, laches and/or unclean hands 
on the part of the Respondents, or the Respondents' fraud. Wildlife Ridge could have asked for 
a pennanent injunction prohibiting Respondents from taking any action to enforce the 
obligations secured by the Deed of Trust, or, as beneficiary, directing the Trustee to pursue non-
judicial foreclosure of the Deed of Trust. Wildlife Ridge did not do any of that. 
Wildlife Ridge argues that the five-year time frame for commencing an action to 
foreclose the Deed of Trust had expired based on the Trust Deed Note's stated maturity date of 
June 28, 2006. Wildlife Ridge offers no acceptable explanation for why this statute of 
limitations claim was not asse1ied in the First Action. 
Nonetheless, Respondents dispute that the applicable statute of limitations has run. Idaho 
Code§ 5-214A provides a five-year statute of limitations for the commencement of an action for 
the foreclosure of a mmigage. That statute states: 
An action for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property must be commenced within 
five (5) years from the maturity date of the obligation or indebtedness secured by such 
m01igage. If the obligation or indebtedness secured by such mortgage does not state a 
maturity date, then the date of the accrual of the cause of action giving rise to the right to 
foreclose shall be deemed the date of maturity of such obligation or indebtedness. 
Idaho Code § 45-1515 adopts the same five-year statute of limitations for the foreclosure of 
deeds of trust. That statute states: 
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The foreclosure of a trust deed by advertisement and sale shall be made and the 
foreclosure of a trust deed by judicial procedure shall be commenced within the time 
limited by the same period and according to the same provisions including extensions as 
provided by law for the foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. 
However, the applicable statute of limitations was restarted by a partial payment made on 
November 8, 2012, thereby extending the maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed of 
Trust, and the right to foreclose that Deed of Trust, until November 8, 2017. R. Aug. p. 075. 
Idaho Code§ 5-238, addresses the effect of paiiial payments. That statute provides: 
No acknowledgment or promise is sufficient evidence of a new or continuing contract by 
which to take the case out of the operation of this chapter, unless the same is contained in 
some wtiting, signed by the paiiy to be charged thereby; but any payment of principal or 
interest is equivalent to a new promise in writing, duly signed, to pay the residue of the 
debt. ( emphasis added). 
Payments of interest or principal serve to restaii the statute of limitations on all 
installments on the note pursuant to Idaho Code § 5-238. Horkley v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 879, 
881, 173 P.3d 1138, 1140 (2007). 
There is no dispute in this case that on November 8, 2012, the Respondents received a 
payment on the Trust Deed Note and Modification in the amount of $38,472.24 and applied that 
payment to the principal due on the obligation. R. Aug. p. 075. As such, this paiiial payment 
made on the Trust Deed Note and Modification restaiied the five-year statute of limitations and 
extended the maturity date of the obligations secured by the Deed of Trust, including the right to 
foreclose that Deed of Trust, until November 8, 2017. 
The Complaint was filed within the five-year limit. R. Vol. I p. 12. Thus, under the 
provisions of LC. § 5-238, the November 8, 2012 partial payment to the Respondents constituted 
"a new promise in writing", extending the statute oflimitations found in I.C. § 5-214A and I.C. § 
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45-1515 for an additional five years. The Respondent's Complaint to enforce the Trust Deed 
Note and Modification and to foreclose the Deed of Trnst was timely filed. The Respondents 
were not ban-ed by the statute of limitations from commencing the present action. 
3. The Administrative Dissolution of Monitor on November 9, 2012, Did Not 
Prevent it From Being Sued in the First Action or From Filing the Present Action. 
Wildlife Ridge attempts to distance itself from the doct1ine of res judicata by arguing that 
since one of the Respondents, Monitor, had been administratively dissolved on November 9, 
2012, it could not have been a real party in the First Action. Thus, the doctrine of res judicata 
could not apply to prevent Wildlife Ridge from asserting the Answer and Counterclaim against 
Monitor in the present action. See, Appellant's Brief, p. 9. 
The dissolution of Monitor before the c01mnencement of the First Action on December 2, 
2014, did not prevent Monitor from appearing in the First Action and defending itself against 
Wildlife Ridge's claims. See, Utah Code Annotated, Sec. 48-3a-703(2)(b )(iii). 
48-3a-703. Winding up. 
(1) A dissolved limited liability company shall wind up its activities and affairs and, 
except as otherwise provided in Section 48-3a-704, the limited liability company 
continues after dissolution only for the purpose of winding up. 
(2) In winding up its activities and affairs, a limited liability company: (emphasis 
added) 
(a) shall discharge the limited liability company's debts, obligations, and other liabilities, 
settle and close the limited liability company's activities and affairs, and marshal and 
distribute the assets of the limited liability company; and 
(b) may: (emphasis added) 
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(i)deliver to the division for filing a statement of dissolution stating the name of the 
limited liability company and that the limited liability company is dissolved; 
(ii) preserve the limited liability company activities, affairs, and property as a going 
concern for a reasonable time; 
(iii) prosecute and def end actions and proceedings, whether civil, criminal, or 
administrative; ( emphasis added); 
(iv) transfer the limited liability company's property; 
(v) settle disputes by mediation or arbitration; 
(vi) deliver to the division for filing a statement of te1mination stating the name of the 
limited liability company and that the limited liability company is te1minated; and 
(vii) perfonn other acts necessary or appropriate to the winding up. 
Monitor was authorized under Utah law to appear in and defend Wildlife's claims in the First 
Action. And as part of its winding down, Monitor was authorized to prosecute the present action 
to enforce its interest in the Trust Deed Note, Modification, and Deed of Trust. 
Further, Wildlife Ridge's argument in this regard does not address the other Respondent, 
First Capital, or challenge First Capital's existence at the time the First Action was dismissed 
with prejudice. Nor does Wildlife Ridge claim that First Capital is not entitled to the protections 
afforded litigants under the doctrine of res judicata. 
As concluded by the trial court, Monitor was a legitimate party in interest and a named 




C. Respondents' Complaint to Judicially Foreclose Deed of Trust Is Not Barred by 
the Doctrine of Res Judicata. 
Wildlife Ridge's Third Issue on Appeal argues that Respondents were barred from 
judicially foreclosing the Deed of Trust in the present action because of the dismissal of the First 
Action. Wildlife Ridge's argument suggests that Respondents had the legal obligation to pursue 
judicial foreclosure of the Deed of Trust in the First Action as a compulsory claim, or suffer the 
consequences of res judicata being applied against them in the present action. 
As defendants in the First Action, Respondents were charged with defending against 
Wildlife Ridge's claim that the obligations secured by the Deed of Trust had been satisfied. All 
Respondents had to prove in order to defeat Wildlife Ridge's claim in the First Action was to 
show that the obligations secured by the Deed of Trust had not been satisfied. 
Wildlife Ridge has acknowledged that on September 10, 2012, Millward filed for relief 
under chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362, an automatic stay 
co1mnenced on September 10, 2012 which prohibited the Respondents from taking any action to 
enforce the Trust Deed Note and Modification against Millward. Respondents were therefore 
stayed from enforcing the Trust Deed Note and Modification, and from foreclosing the Deed of 
Trust securing those obligations until Millward's bankruptcy case was closed on June 23, 2016.2 
The dismissal of Millward' s bankruptcy proceeding occurred after the First Action was 
dismissed. 
2 Upon the closing of his bankruptcy case Millward's discharge under 1 I U.S.C 3727 became final and Respondents 
were prohibited from pursuing him in the present action. 
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The automatic stay created by Millward's bankruptcy filing also prohibited Respondents 
from pursuing M & S Development because that limited liability company was wholly owned by 
Millward and his wife, Stephanie, and therefore property of the Millward Bankruptcy Estate. R. 
Vol. Ip. 157 (Schedule B - Personal Property). 
11 U.S.C. § 362 provides: 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under 
section 301 [a voluntary case under any chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, 
including Chapter 7], 302, or 303 ohhis title, or an application filed under section 
5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, operates as a stay, 
applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of 
process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding against the 
debtor that was or could have been commenced before the commencement of the 
case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the 
commencement of the case under this title; ( emphasis added) 
*** 
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against propeiiy of the estate. 
*** 
11 U.S.C. § 362 prevented Respondents from asking, and the trial court from issuing its 
process or summons against Millward and M & S Development. Respondents were also stayed 
from pursuing any act against Millward's property, M & S Development such as pursuing a 
judgment lien against it for any deficiency after the foreclosure of the Deed of Trust. 
As a result, the trial court was prevented from obtaining jurisdiction over Millward and 
M & S Development during the pendency of the First Action. Respondents, therefore, could not 
pursue enforcement of the Trust Deed Note, Modification, and Deed of Trust in the First Action. 
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Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 13( a) provides: 
Compulsory Counterclaim . 
(1) In General. A pleading must state as a counterclaim any claim that, at the time 
of its service, the pleader has against an opposing party if the claim: 
(A) arises out of the transaction or occun-ence that is the subject matter of the 
opposing party's claim; and 
(B) does not require adding another party over whom the court cannot acquire 
jurisdiction. (Emphasis added). 
Millward and M & S Development, as makers of the Trust Deed Note and Modification, 
were indispensable parties in any action Respondents could prosecute in order to enforce the 
Trust Deed Note and Modification, and also judicially foreclose the Deed of Trust securing those 
obligations. Galvanizer's Co. v. State Highway Commission, 8 Wn.App. 804, 807, 509 P2d. 73 
(Wash. App. 1973). 
Under I.R.C.P. 19(a)(l), Millward and M & S Development needed to be brought into the 
First Action before Respondents could be afforded complete relief. Millward and M & S 
Development had a right to independently challenge the enforcement of the Trust Deed Note, 
Modification and Deed of Trust in the First Action had the Respondents attempted to enforce 
their rights under those instruments. 
Unlike Wildlife Ridge's right to assert any and all claims against the Respondents to 
render unenforceable the Trust Deed Note and Modification and to prevent any future 
foreclosure of the Deed of Trust by the Respondents, the Respondents were prohibited from 
joining Millward and M & S Development in the First Action and litigating their claims under 
the Trust Deed Note, Modification, and Deed of Trust due to the applicable bankruptcy stay. A 
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fortiori, Respondents did not actually litigate their claims under the Trust Deed Note, 
Modification or Deed of Trust in the First Action, nor could they. Respondents are not prohibited 
from pursuing their claims in the present action under this doctrine of res judicata. 
ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondents have complied with I.A.R. 41 by asserting that they are entitled to an 
attorney fee award in their statement of issues on appeal. 
Idaho Code § 12- 120 (3) allows a prevailing party in a civil action to recover attorney 
fees "on an open account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract 
relating to the purchase or sale of goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial 
transaction." Respondents contend that the underlying Trust Deed Note, Modification and Deed 
of Trust give rise to an award of fees under this section both because Respondents were seeking 
recovery under a note or negotiable instrument (the Trust Deed Note) and because its loan to 
Millward and M & S Development arose out of a conunercial transaction whereby the 
Respondents provided financing to Millward and M & S Development to improve the real 
property desc1ibed in the Deed of Trust and develop the Wildlife Ridge residential subdivision. 
Further, Wildlife Ridge's prosecution of this appeal notwithstanding the clear 
applicability of res judicata to the claims and defenses asserted in its Answer and Counterclaim, 
leads to a reasonable conclusion that Wildlife Ridge's appeal has been brought and pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably, and without foundation. Treasure Valley Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. 
Earth Resources Co., 115 Idaho 373,380, 766 P.2d 1254, 1261 (Ct.App.1988) 
For these reasons, this Court should award attorney fees in favor of the Respondents. 
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CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of res judicata was applied correctly by the trial court. Wildlife Ridge was 
obligated to assert in the First Action all of the claims and defenses it asserted in its Answer and 
Counterclaim because all of those defenses and claims existed before and during the pendency of 
the First Action. The dismissal of the First Action, with prejudice, constituted a decision on the 
merits which precludes the re-litigation of those claims and all related claims in this case. 
Respondents were not required to pursue judicial foreclosure of the Deed of Trust in the 
First Action because Millward and M & S Development were indispensable parties to such an 
action and they could not be joined as parties in the First Action by reason of Millward's pending 
bankruptcy case and the applicable bankruptcy stay. Therefore, Respondents were not precluded 
from pursuing its claims in the present action and recovering the foreclosure decree and 
deficiency judgment entered by the trial court. 
The decisions below should be affinned. Respondents should be awarded their costs 
including their reasonable attorney fees on appeal. 
DATED this 17111 day of May, 2018. 
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. and First 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY on the 1 ?111 day of May, 2018 I served two (2) true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Respondents' Brief as follows: 
Richard A. Heam 
A. Bruce Larson 
Heam Law, PLC 
155 S. 2nd Ave. 
Pocatello, ID 83201 
[ x] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile - 208-932-1083 
[ ] Email to: 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
The undersigned does hereby ce1tify that the electronic b1ief submitted is in compliance 
with all of the requirements set out in I.A.R. 34.1 , and that an electronic copy was served on each 
party at the following address: 
Richard A. Heam, counsel for the Appellant Wildlife Ridge Estates, LLC, at 
Dated and certified this 1 ?111 day of May, 2018. 
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Funding, L.C. 
